Critical Internet Bill....(Admin Allowed Post)

For what it's worth, I've written an article on this and submitted it to EZA
asking readers to contact their representatives.

If EZA doesn't print it (highly likely) I'll put it on my blog and ask my list to
spread the word around.

If we make this a coordinated effort, we can make enough noise to get this
joke of a bill shut down.

So does that mean you are just going to remain quiet while they take everything that is left? In my opinion we should have taken them all out of office over the bailout --- but just because they feel free to ignore us no matter what the issue.......it doesn't mean we should allow them to feel they are safe bulldozing us either. Time to put control freaks out of office.

You're right, but they figure this TRUMPS the constitution. This makes them BOLDER!

Here's my post about the same legislation from the main forum:

First comment: If you're going to react based on the misleading title of the story, don't waste your time. It's not an accurate representation of the situation at all.

Second, if you don't think some sort of centralized response mechanism is necessary for responding to cyber-attacks, you are less informed than you should be on the issue. The potential vectors for attack, and the known potential targets, make this a critical activity. The question isn't "should" they do it, but rather can they do it effectively.

Third, if you haven't taken strong steps to protect your system from falling under the control of an outside party, you'd be much better off spending your time working on that than theorizing that this is some evil scheme to expand government control.

The most powerful form of brute force attacks online at the moment is the existence of large and decentralized botnets. Private computers, like the one you're using to read this, which are infected with programs that let some remote party make your system do things without your knowledge.

The scope, size and capabilities of these bot networks is constantly growing. Many of them are already sufficient to take down very large sites and legitimate networks, without external help or cooperation between controllers. They're mostly used for spamming, phishing and DDoS attacks, but that could change in a day.

The threat these tools pose is extraordinary, and cannot continue to be ignored or treated as a casual inconvenience.

Similar problems exist for hosted servers and many other systems connected to the Net. And then there are the problems associated with individual or small-group intrusions, attacks by agents of foreign governments, and the ever-present threat of an "inside job." These are all greater threats to your privacy, security and personal finances than anything the government is likely to consider, even in the case of abuse of the system.

That said, we should pay attention to this and work to keep even the smallest abuses from occurring, where possible. One does not secure freedom by changing masters.

Remember, this isn't about reading your private emails (they can already do that if they want) or controlling your actions online. It's about actual threats to real systems on which people's lives and daily activities depend. Some examples to consider:

The networks which control ATMs, credit card systems, cash transfers and other financial transactions. Let someone get even minor control or blockage on these systems, and there'd be hell to pay. You'd be the one getting the bill for it.

The telephone network, especially emergency responder systems: Take down the phone system, or just the switches involving emergency responders, in an area and you've got people dying, unnecessary property loss and random failures in response to criminal activity.

If that's co-ordinated with a serious attack of some other kind, it could be disastrous, multiplying the damage of the offline event.

The stock exchanges: Consider the potential damage if an attacker could gain control of even a small portion of the systems that control stock trading or commodities exchanges.

Transportation control systems: Air traffic controls, switching systems for subways and trains, or even something as simple as the controls for traffic lights, where those are centralized. Use your imagination.

SMS (text messaging) servers/systems: How much damage could someone do by sending ominous threats to masses of people via text messages? Or spreading false stories through the same medium? Or simply flooding the system with garbage, or stopping it entirely?

SMS is not just used by teenagers. A lot of secruity systems use it for notifications, along with companies that rely on it for employee communications.

News sites: A very simple social hack. Plant false stories simultaneously on a few of the major news sites, and you could create a panic, with the results being affected largely by the focus of the story.

These are just a few potential problems, from among the hundreds (or thousands) that could be made to happen through attacks on the virtual infrastructure. There are many that are much worse than anything I've listed here.

Just think about the number of things that can be affected or controlled by network-connected interfaces. Then consider that there are people out there already planning or developing systems to attack most of them.

The problem is already huge. It could get much bigger very quickly with the right kind of attack. And we're not anything like ready for it.

You'd be surprised at the damage that can be done by just one (1) compromised machine on a broadband connection. There are millions of such compromised machines out there, right now.


Paul

Michael, Ummm... Not the best example.

Even if it were, this cannot be something that's centralized like that. It's not possible, desirable, or probably Constitutionally acceptable.


Paul

I don't see anyone in this thread saying the government should or can provide the solution at the local level. Simply questioning how the response mechanism should work when attacks are reported and a decision is made as to what needs to be done to stop them.


Paul

Steven,

There isn't any way to prevent the problems. Only to mitigate them somewhat, and keep them from becoming major interruptions.

David, Yes. Let's.

I've heard from people who work with banks on phishing that, for some of them, it's their number one cause of loss. Yes, really.

And there's the much more significant potential problem of DNS poisoning. What's a bank going to do about that on their own, sir?


Paul

Its not quite that easy to get rid of bad policy makers.